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Abstract 
 
What leads personality to develop in adulthood? Values, guiding principles that apply across 
contexts, may capture motivation for growth and change. An essentialist trait perspective posits 
that personality changes only as a result of organic factors. But evidence suggests that 
psychosocial factors also influence personality change, especially during young adulthood. In the 
Life and Time study of sources of personality change in adulthood, we specifically explore 
ethically-relevant value priorities, those related to the relative prioritization of narrow self-
interest over the concerns of a larger community. According to Rollo May (1967), “mature 
values”, including aspects of both self-transcendence and self-determination, should serve to 
diminish or prevent neurotic anxiety. This is consistent with research on materialism, which is 
associated with lower well-being. An index based on May’s proposal and several related 
constructs (materialism, unmitigated self-interest, collectivism and individualism) are tested 
longitudinally as possible antecedents of Big Five/Six personality trait change using bivariate 
LCMSR models in a national community sample (N = 864 at Time 1). Contrary to an essentialist 
trait perspective, these value priorities more often preceded change in personality traits than vice-
versa. Somewhat consistent with May’s theory, higher “mature” values preceded higher 
openness (statistically significant at the p < .005 level). Higher vertical individualism 
significantly preceded lower compassion, intellect and openness. At the suggestive (p < .05) 
level, higher unmitigated self-interest preceded lower conscientiousness, higher vertical 
individualism preceded higher volatility, higher mature values preceded higher honesty/propriety 
and politeness, higher horizontal collectivism preceded higher orderliness, agreeableness, and 
assertiveness and lower intellect, and higher horizontal individualism preceded lower 
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withdrawal. In two of three cases, suggestive personality-as-antecedent-of-values-change effects 
were reciprocal with the values-effects: higher conscientiousness scores reciprocally preceded 
lower unmitigated self-interest, and higher volatility higher vertical individualism. No significant 
or suggestive “stand-alone”, non-reciprocal personality on values effects were found. 
Keywords: Values, Longitudinal Studies, Personality Change, Five Factor Personality 
Model, Personality Development             
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Ethics-Relevant Values as Antecedents of Personality Change: 
Longitudinal Findings from the Life and Time Study 
 What leads personality to develop in adulthood? Values, guiding principles that apply 
across contexts, may capture motivation for growth and change. Whether value priorities are 
defined by one’s family and culture, or whether they reflect a later, individual choice, they reflect 
how we wish to be. For example, a devout Buddhist will likely value compassion and want to 
increase in such traits, whatever their initial level. Someone trying to advance in an American 
corporate setting, on the other hand, will likely value ambition and assertiveness, and will seek to 
increase those traits. A common-sense view is that our values will drive our behavior, and that 
we will seek to act in ways in accordance with our goals, more than the alternative, in which our 
behavior drives our values. This study explores the role of a set of ethically-relevant, broader-
scope versus self-focused values as antecedents of personality trait change, providing a test of 
this common-sense, values-influence-behavior view. The converse, that personality tendencies 
precede and influence change in values, is also tested.   
Broader-scope versus self-focused values 
Value priorities have been defined as trans-situational goals that set out desirable end-
states or behaviors, and guide how people choose and evaluate behaviors and situations 
(Schwartz, 1992). There are a variety of way to operationalize value priorities, for example the 
well-known Schwartz and Rokeach scales of basic human values, and Holland’s (1985) model of 
work values, expressed as interests. Some value-priorities contrasts assess personal preferences, 
for example the preference for stimulation versus conformity in the Schwartz model, or artistic 
rather than investigative interests in Holland’s model. But ethics and moral virtue are also related 
to value priorities, for example to the tension between the valuing of the concerns of a larger 
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community over narrow self-interest. The current study focuses on these kinds of values, 
described also by Thalmayer, Saucier, Srivastava, Flournoy, and Costello (2019). This contrast 
between broader-scope versus self-focused values is associated with cultural and moral 
socialization, which presumably continues throughout adulthood. In family life, religious and 
spiritual traditions, and many other contexts, social influence will encourage concern for others. 
This is therefore a sector of the values domain in which “maturation” seems especially likely to 
be ongoing.  
Values are not commonly measured as a spectrum from broader-scope to self-focused 
values. To explore this less familiar domain, value priorities are tested in several ways in the 
current study. Firstly, they are measured in terms of an index derived from the theoretical 
writings of Rollo May (1967), who outlined the starting point for a values-driven theory of 
personality change. In May’s view, optimal self-development should include a shift to “mature” 
values, and this shift would serve to diminish neurotic anxiety. “Mature values” include aspects 
of self-transcendence like empathy and generosity as well as aspects of self-determination like 
creativity and freedom. Self-knowledge, independence, and an ethical grounding in compassion 
and caring for others should come together in an optimally developed, non-neurotic, “mature” 
person.  
This development would logically include broad-minded, compassionate worldview 
beliefs. A measure of worldview beliefs, capturing the self-focused pole, is also used in this 
study. The construct of unmitigated self-interest (Saucier, 2000, 2013) encompasses hedonism, 
materialism, and solipsism. These self-focused, small-minded priorities align with May’s view of 
an undeveloped, immature individual. Relatedly, by May’s standards, materialistic values are 
immature, and this specific aspect of self-focused values-priorities has been well studied. A 
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meta-analysis of 151 studies from around the globe confirms their consistent association with 
lower well-being (Dittmar, Bond, Hurst & Kasser, 2014). Longitudinal studies show similar 
associations (Kasser et al., 2014).  
Finally, collectivism and individualism measures (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) also 
concern value-priorities (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002), though their association 
with personality development is not yet well explored. Individualists prioritize independence, 
personal freedom (from constraints placed by others), uniqueness, and self-determination. The 
relation with self-focus is clearest when these are further defined in terms of degree of hierarchy. 
Vertical individualism, the most self-focused component, indicates a focus on autonomy in an 
unequal world in which individuals compete for status, whereas horizontal individualism 
indicates a value for autonomy in a more equal world of unique, independent, and self-reliant 
individuals. Collectivists value duty, obligation, social harmony, and self-transcendence (Le & 
Levenson, 2005), and both components in terms of hierarchy would appear to capture broader-
scoped values: Vertical collectivism indicates a focus on duties to family or other in-groups 
where some have more authority than others, whereas horizontal collectivism indicates s strong 
value for relationships with peers who are more or less one’s equal (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998).   
These values constructs – materialism, immature values, unmitigated self-interest, and 
individualism – overlap. All (with the exception of horizontal individualism) can indicate either 
moral engagement with a broader community or self-focused priorities. In terms of the well-
known Schwartz values types, they represent prioritization of hedonism and power over 
benevolence, and more broadly of self-enhancement over self-transcendence.  
Value change across the lifespan  
In a previous study, this set of broader-scope versus self-focused values was largely 
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stable over a three-year period, with some age-normative shifts: People on average became less 
self-focused with increasing age, and women had slightly less self-focused values than men 
(Thalmayer et al., 2019). These findings are highly consistent with the substantial mean-level, 
rank-order, and longitudinal stability established for the popular Schwartz Values Scale (Bardi, 
Lee, Hofmann-Towfigh, & Soutar, 2009; Milfont, Milojev, & Sibley, 2016; Vecchione et al., 
2016; Vecchione, Alessandri, Roccas, & Caprara, 2018), which considers relative priorities 
among 10 or 11 values proposed to derive from four universal requirements of human existence 
(Schwartz, 1992). Schwartz’s model differs from the constructs explored in the current study by 
being a broader model of human motivations, less specifically focused on the contrast of 
ethically-relevant values, although results based on that model have been used to address such 
questions. For example, Silfver, Helkama, Lönnqvist, and Verkasalo (2008) reported that guilt-
proneness and empathy were positively related to self-transcendence values (universalism, 
benevolence, tradition, and conformity), and negatively to self-enhancement values (power, 
hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction); much like the pattern found for associations with 
moral sensitivity (Myyry & Helkama, 2002). And Schwartz and Bardi (2001) found that values 
of benevolence and universalism, the most morally-relevant of the 10 Schwartz value types, were 
the most highly endorsed across diverse societies. 
Although the emphasis is on normative changes rather than optimal development or 
personal growth, as in May’s theory, the empirical evidence supports a general trend away from 
self-focus and toward broader-scoped value priorities with age. Milfont and colleagues (2016), 
who administered a measure of Schwartz values one year apart for three years to a sample of 
adults in New Zealand, reported greater endorsement of conservation and self-transcendence and 
less endorsement of openness and self-enhancement values for older participants. Gouveia and 
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colleagues (2015) reported higher interpersonal and normative scores and lower excitement and 
self-promotion for older participants on the Basic Values Survey (BVS) in a large cross-sectional 
Brazilian sample. Robinson (2013) reported higher tradition and conservative values and lower 
stimulation and openness to change values in older participants in a large pan-European sample. 
(Such studies, of course, cannot distinguish typical change with age from cohort effects.)  
Personality change and development 
 The influential Five Factor Theory (e.g. McCrae & Allik, 2002) conceives personality as 
fixed, with the basic tendencies underlying phenotypic traits only changing as a result of organic 
factors, such as physical aging, brain injury, or medications. Substantial recent empirical 
evidence, however, indicates a degree of personality change across the lifespan, in addition to 
significant stability. Cross sectional studies of Big Five traits demonstrate predictable age 
differences – older people are, on average, more agreeable, conscientious and emotionally stable 
than younger ones (Soto, John, Gosling, & Potter, 2011). A meta-analysis of 92 longitudinal 
studies has similarly shown individuals to increase in conscientiousness, emotional stability and 
social dominance (extraversion) in young adulthood, then later to increase in agreeableness and 
decrease in social vitality (extraversion) and openness (Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006).  
What leads individuals to change? Social investment theory posits that people develop 
more adaptive traits through commitment to and socialization into social roles, which are often 
age-normative (Lodi-Smith & Roberts, 2007), a theory supported by cross cultural evidence that 
normative personality differences appear at younger ages in cultures with an earlier onset of 
adult role-responsibilities, in particular earlier transition to the labor force (Bleidorn et al., 2013). 
Additionally, clinical interventions have also been seen to effectively change personality traits 
(Roberts et al., 2017 provide a meta-analysis of 207 studies). 
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Another possible source of personality change is an individual’s values. A role for value 
priorities as an influence on personality is consistent with Dweck’s (2017) integrative theory of 
motivation, personality, and development. In this theory, basic needs for acceptance, 
predictability, and competence drive behavior from early in life, by animating goals designed to 
meet basic needs. Pursuit of need-fulfilling goals leads to mental representations, which guide 
future goals and create characteristic, recurrent patterns of behavior i.e., personality traits. In 
contrast to Five Factor Theory, this theory posits that while temperament can impact social–
cognitive processes, it is social–cognitive processes that play the leading role in affecting 
behavior patterns. Personality change and development is driven by mental representations, 
including value priorities as a form of motivation. For example, to meet the basic need for 
acceptance, a value priority of materialism could lead one to dress and live in a way that conveys 
status; the need for predictability is then met by having concrete, literal markers for self-worth 
and how rewards are achieved. Acceptance could instead be sought by someone who prioritizes 
“mature values” in terms of self-acceptance. Competence, control, self-esteem, and self-
coherence could be sought by this person by pursuing self-actualization in a way that includes 
both personal autonomy and empathic concern for others.   
In summary, while personality was once theorized to be static during adulthood, 
contemporary research suggests that some amount of change and development is to be expected. 
Two sources of change supported by empirical evidence are social-role investment and clinical 
interventions. Another possible source of change, explored here, is individuals’ ethical-value 
priorities. 
Values and Personality  
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The broader-scope versus self-focused values of interest in this project – materialism, 
immature values, unmitigated self-interest, and individualism – appear to be largely distinct from 
Big Five and Big Six personality traits. As reported by Thalmayer and colleagues (2019), the 
exceptions are moderate positive correlations between the mature values index and openness 
(around .43 on average), and between the moderately intercorrelated (magnitudes of .33 to .49) 
set of values measures – horizontal and vertical collectivism, and the mature value index, versus 
vertical individualism and materialism – with honesty/propriety and agreeableness (.19 to .56 in 
magnitude). 
This is similar to correlational findings reported for the Schwartz values. In a meta-
analysis of 60 studies using the Five-Factor Model of personality traits and Schwartz values, 
Parks-Leduc, Feldman and Bardi (2015) report consistent and theoretically meaningful 
relationships but with small to medium effect sizes. Overall, the traits that might be thought of as 
more cognitively based, especially openness to experience, followed by agreeableness, 
extraversion, and conscientiousness, were more strongly related to values than the arguably more 
emotionally based traits like emotional stability. Another meta-analysis of correlations between 
Big Five traits and Schwartz values from 14 countries again reported associations between Big 
Five higher openness and agreeableness and values scales (specifically with lower conservation 
and higher self-transcendence, respectively; Fischer & Boer, 2015). Trait-value associations, 
however, were seen to be stronger in countries with more democratic institutions and permissive 
social contexts, and weaker in those with greater financial, ecological, and social threats (Fischer 
& Boer, 2015). 
The influence of personality traits and values variables on each other over time has only 
recently been examined. Fetvadjiev and He (2018) reported their mutual effects using a broader 
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set of values constructs than those selected for the current study, in a nationally representative 
panel from the Netherlands, tested five times over eight years. They found that Big Five traits 
measured by the 50-item IPIP measure predicted change in Rokeach values more strongly than 
vice versa; personality traits also predicted well-being and self-esteem more strongly than did the 
values. Similarily, Vecchione and colleagues (2018) tested the mutual effects of the 10 Schwartz 
values and Big Five personality traits among Italian young adults assessed three times over 12 
years. They found that while this set of values (also much less specific than the value-priorities 
measured in the current study) did not affect trait development, high agreeableness predicted an 
increase in benevolence values, and high openness an increase in self-direction values.  
Goals for the current study 
Recent research indicates that personality change occurs throughout the lifespan, though 
the sources of such change are not yet fully understood. Here we test ethically-relevant, broader-
scope versus self-focused values as antecedents of, and alternatively as potential outcomes of 
personality trait change, with four measurements over three years in a diverse national sample.  
This study tests two competing hypotheses. The “null model” represented by Five Factor 
Theory (McCrae & Costa, 1999), is that effects of traits as antecedents to changes in values will 
tend to be larger than the effects of values as antecedents to changes in traits. This null model, in 
which traits are causes and not effects, was recently supported by findings with other types of 
value-priorities by Fetvadjiev and He (2018) and Vecchione and colleagues (2018). The other 
hypothesis, that indicators of immature values and worldviews (unmitigated self-interest, 
materialistic values) will precede and predict increased neuroticism, whereas broader-scoped, 
“mature” values would lead to decreased neuroticism, is based on May’s theoretical proposal and 
on previous literature, primarily for materialism. We extend this hypothesis more broadly to 
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what might be argued as “unfavorable change” among other personality traits, specifically lower 
conscientiousness (like neuroticism, a trait targeted for clinical interventions; Roberts, Hill, & 
Davis, 2018), and pro-sociality in terms of lower agreeableness and honesty/propriety. Another 
logical expectation would be that collectivism would associate with higher scores on traits 
related to social self-regulation (conscientiousness, agreeableness, honesty/propriety), and 
individualism with traits related to dynamism (extraversion and openness).  
Methods 
The Life and Time study grant application, which details all hypotheses for the overall 
study, is available at https://osf.io/bdseu/, along with study materials, data, and code and output 
for all analyses. The Life and Time Study is a four-wave, three-year longitudinal study on values 
and social roles as sources of personality change, including three separate samples: a national 
sample recruited via Mechanical Turk, an e-mail marketing firm, Google Adwords, and 
Craigslist ads in communities around the United States whose demographic profile was favorable 
to enhancing minority representation; a student sample recruited on college campuses; and a 
sample of informants recruited by participants to provide peer-ratings on themselves. The study 
was reviewed by the Office for the Protection of Human Subjects of the University of Oregon in 
2009. 
Participants  
A total of 879 individuals representing all major geographical regions of the Unites 
States, joined the Life and Time Study national sample. From the full sample, 10 cases were 
dropped due to impossible age variations across the waves (beyond a typo that affected only one 
of three or four otherwise consistent responses) suggesting an insincere participant, and five 
because the participant did not report age (final sample N = 864; 66% female). Of these, 628 
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provided data at Time 2, 594 at Time 3, and 578 at Time 4. Some participants did not answer all 
scales at all waves; the minimum sample size for each wave is 862 (Time 1), 619 (Time 2), 590 
(Time 3), 573 (Time 4). The age of participants at Time 1 (in the year 2010) ranged from 18 to 
63 (M = 36, SD = 10.5). The ethnic composition of the sample was similar to that of the general 
United States population: 71% non-Hispanic White, Caucasian, or European-American; 12% 
Black or African-American; 8% Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish; 5% Asian or Asian-American; 2% 
American Indian or Alaska Native; 1% Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander. For more 
details, including geographical regions and education level, see Thalmayer et al. (2019). 	
Procedure 
Recruitment is described in further detail in Thalmayer et al. (2019). At each wave, 
participants were emailed a link to a website to complete a battery of self-report questionnaires, 
including two personality scales, described below, and values, aspirations, worldviews, goals, 
life events, and relationship, work, and life satisfaction items. Participants were compensated 
with a gift card for $20-40 (increasing across waves) to an internet retailer after completing 
surveys. Participants could opt to receive a check in the mail instead. Analyses of Big Five and 
Big Six rank-order stability, mean-level change, and measurement invariance in the Life and 
Time national sample are reported in Costello, Srivastava, and Saucier (2017). 
Materials 
The Life and Time study focused on personality change during adulthood. Values-scales 
related to May’s concept of mature values were included as hypothetical predictors of 
personality change. We report on the full set of values variables included in the study, detailed in 
Table 1. Note that personality traits were measured using both the Big Five and Big Six models 
of personality; although the Big Five is the most common way to measure normal-range 
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personality attributes, the Big Six has been proposed as an update to the model as it appears to be 
more replicable across lexical studies in diverse languages (Saucier, 2009). The most significant 
difference between the models is the addition of a dimension with content related to moral and 
ethical behavior and to adhering to prosocial norms. Whether the variable selection is relatively 
narrow (e.g., Ashton et al., 2004) or inclusive (e.g., Saucier, 2009), this sixth “honesty” 
dimension tends to arise in studies of the natural language, indicating social importance across 
diverse cultural settings. While the two models are highly similar, the Big Six has demonstrated 
an advantage in predictive and explanatory power in terms of grades in college (Thalmayer, 
Saucier, & Eigenhuis, 2011), political attitudes (Chirumbolo & Leone, 2010), vocational 
interests (McKay & Tokar, 2012), workplace delinquency (Lee, Ashton, & de Vries, 2005), and 
life aspirations and sexual well-being (Visser & Pozzebon, 2013).  
Big Five Inventory (BFI)-Six. Personality traits were measured with the 44-item BFI 
(John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008) plus a 16-item addendum to create a six-factor version (as in 
Thalmayer et al., 2011). The addendum includes an honesty/propriety scale drawn largely from 
the Questionnaire Big Six (Saucier, 2009; Thalmayer et al., 2011), similar to the 
Honesty/Humility factor in the HEXACO (Ashton & Lee, 2007). Items on this scale included: 
“is not good at deceiving other people”, “sticks to the rules”, “uses others for my own ends”, 
“takes risks that could cause trouble for me”, “misrepresents the facts”, “has bad manners”, “uses 
flattery to get ahead,” and “would never take things that aren't mine.” The BFI-Six also includes 
an alternative agreeableness (B6) scale (as in Thalmayer et al., 2011), with more content related 
to lack of short-temperedness and irritability than typical Big Five agreeableness. Items were 
rated on a scale from 1 to 5, with higher numbers indicating greater agreement. Scale statistics 
are reported in Thalmayer et al. (2019; a = .79 to .88). To aid interpretation across scales, all 
PERSONALITY AND VALUES 15 
dependent measures were rescaled with a linear transformation, [observed score – minimum 
possible] / [maximum possible - minimum possible] x 100, to percent of maximum possible 
(POMP) scores to give them a range from 0 to 100 (Cohen, Cohen, Aiken, & West, 1999).  
 Big Five Aspect Scales (BFAS). The 100-item BFAS (DeYoung, Quilty, Peterson, & 
Carver, 2007; a = .78 to .91) includes two 10-items scales, capturing distinct but correlated 
aspects of each of the Big Five dimensions:  industriousness and orderliness, compassion and 
politeness, volatility and withdrawal, assertiveness and enthusiasm, intellect and openness. Items 
are rated on a 5-point Likert-type	scale	as from extremely inaccurate to extremely accurate in 
terms of describing oneself.	
 Mature Values Index. A preliminary index of mature values was developed by the 
second author and a graduate assistant, both of whom scrutinized May’s (1967) writings on 
mature values, and rated the relative suitability of items from the Schwartz (1992) or Rokeach 
(1973) values surveys. The consensus selection includes 10 forward-keyed (freedom, choosing 
own goals, meaning in life, creativity, a world of beauty, wisdom, being honest, being helpful, 
mature love, and unity with nature) and seven reverse-keyed items (pleasure, a comfortable life, 
wealth, social power, social recognition, preserving my public image, and being obedient), with a 
response scale as in Schwartz (1992), from -1 from “opposed to my values” to +7 “of supreme 
importance”. Note that all items are found on the Schwartz scale, but only 10 of the 17 on 
Rokeach’s. The forward-keyed and reverse-keyed items were averaged and POMP-scored as two 
subscales, which were then averaged for the final scale used in analyses. Correlations of all 
values scales with each other and with personality scales are reported in Thalmayer et al. (2019). 
Note that the mature values index is a composite, what some have termed a “formative” scale, 
meaning that it comprises a group of concepts chosen because all are theoretically associated 
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with the construct, thus there is no basis for any assumptions about their interrelations, or 
expectation for unidimensionality. Neither Rollo May nor existential psychology in general 
would propose that autonomy should be empirically positively correlated with self-
transcendence; the spirit of May’s proposal is instead that the two different qualities have a 
positive synergy together, such that mature values emerge from their combination. Measurement 
models for formative indices are more difficult to evaluate for measurement invariance and in 
this data-set we do not have the requisite instruments for testing invariance hypotheses 
(Diamantopoulos & Papadopoulos, 2010). For this reason we did not evaluate it for measurement 
invariance, and therefore cannot rule out the possibility that any differences across age reflect 
differences in the performance of the instrument across age groups. 
Unmitigated Self-Interest. This 6-item scale (Saucier, 2000, 2013; Thalmayer et al., 
2019; a = .67), measures hedonism, materialism, and solipsism, using a 5-point Likert-type scale 
from strongly disagree to strongly agree, with half the items reverse-keyed. Example items 
include: “The pleasures of the senses are the highest good,” and “People ought to be motivated 
by something beyond their own self-interest.” Although these might be read as statements of 
beliefs, they involve strong valuations placed on pleasure, material possessions, and self-interest. 
As regards solipsism, if nothing outside the self exists, it follows that nothing outside the self has 
value. 
Materialism. This 6-item scale is derived from items in Richins and Dawson’s (1992) 
scale of materialistic values, based on item reduction efforts (Shen-Miller, 2009; Shen-Miller, 
Saucier & Pan, 2015), as described in Thalmayer and colleagues (2019; a = .80). Half the items 
were reverse-keyed and all are answered on the same 5-point Likert-type scale as BFAS items, 
from extremely inaccurate to extremely accurate in terms of describing oneself. Example items 
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include “Would be happier if I could afford to buy more things” and “Don’t pay much attention 
to the material objects other people own.” 
Financial Aspirations. Aspirations for Financial Success (Kasser & Ryan, 1993; 
a = .80) is one of five scales on a 23-item inventory of aspirations. The scale includes five items 
worded in the second person (e.g. “You will buy things just because you want them”) rated on a 
5-point Likert-type scale from “not at all important” to “very important”. This scale was mean-
centered using the four scales administered.  
Individualism and Collectivism. In the scales provided by Triandis and Gelfand (1998), 
individualism is split into two components. Vertical individualism has a focus on autonomy in an 
unequal world in which individuals compete for status, whereas horizontal individualism focuses 
on autonomy in an implicitly equal world of unique, independent, and self-reliant individuals. 
Collectivism is similarly split: Vertical collectivism has a focus on duties to family or other in-
groups where some have more authority than others, whereas horizontal collectivism focuses on 
enjoyment of relationships with peers who are more or less one’s equal (Triandis & Gelfand, 
1998).  Each of the four subscales was measured with four total items, all keyed in the same 
direction, and all answered on a 5-point Likert-type scale from strongly disagree to strongly 
agree (a = .56 to .71).  
Analyses 
Reciprocal relations between personality and values scales were tested using bivariate 
latent curve models with structured residuals (LCM-SR; Curran, Howard, Bainter, Lane, & 
McGinley, 2014). The LCM-SR overcomes limitations of the traditional cross-lagged panel 
model (CLPM) that, as demonstrated by Hamaker, Kuiper, & Grasman (2015), confounds 
within- and between-person covariance because it does not account for trait-like stability. The 
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LCM-SR effectively decomposes covariance into between-person trait-like linear stability (as 
instantiated in the latent curve component of the model) and within-person wave-to-wave auto-
regression as well as reciprocal, lagged influences from one construct to the other (which is 
accomplished by modeling the residuals from the LCM using the traditional CLPM structure). 
Each of the BFI-Six scales and ten BFAS scales was tested separately in relation to each of the 
eight values scales, in all tests accounting for age, using Mplus 7 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012), 
with robust maximum likelihood estimation (MLR). See Figure 1 for an example of the model. 
Interpretation focuses on cross-lagged coefficients for regression of subsequent personality score 
on previous values scores, and subsequent values on previous personality score, which indicate 
the extent to which values influence personality traits over time and vice versa. Within-wave 
(within-person) intercept correlations are also interpreted as a way to separate within- and 
between-person variance, a strength of LCM-SR (Curran et al., 2014; Hamaker, Kuiper, & 
Grasman, 2015). These residual correlations account for individual differences in trait-levels and 
linear trends in trait-levels, and for levels during previous waves. Non-zero correlations indicate 
within-person processes linking fluctuations in responses to personality and the values indicators, 
and provide a way to address state versus trait variation.  
Per Benjamin and colleagues (2018) we define results with a false positive rate under the 
null hypothesis less than 5% (alpha = .05) as “suggestive”, and only those with a false positive 
rate under the null hypothesis less than 0.5% (alpha = .005) as “statistically significant”. We also 
provide supplementary tables with all within-person cross-lagged and contemporaneous 
coefficients and p-values corrected to control the family-wise error (FWE) rate across all tests 
within direction (e.g., lagged values-to-personality; k = 128) at α = .05 (Holm, 1979), and to 
control the false discovery rate (FDR) at q = .05 (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). 
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The measurement invariance of the values scales (with the exception of the mature values 
index, as discussed above) across four age groups corresponding to decades, participants in their 
20s (N = 304), 30s (N = 227), 40s (N = 199), and 50s (N = 132), is described in Thalmayer and 
colleagues (2019). The measurement invariance of the personality scales across the age groups is 
described in Costello and colleagues (2017). Because changes in McDonald’s non-centrality fit 
index (MFI; McDonald, 1989) exceeded the threshold for assuming perfect measurement 
invariance for the values scales other than horizontal individualism, we used modified scales as 
in Thalmayer and colleagues (2019) to test the sensitivity of results to measurement issues. 
Comparisons of the results reported below and those found for the modified-to-be-invariant 
values scales (all available in supplemental materials) indicated that the directions and size of the 
cross-lag coefficients were generally highly similar, with a mean absolute difference of 0.017, 
SD = 0.014 (range from 0 to 0.085) and mean absolute coefficient estimate of 0.039, SD = 0.035. 
The mean absolute difference for significant (p < .005) cross-lag coefficients was 0.021, SD = 
0.011 (range 0.010 to 0.033), with mean absolute coefficient estimate of 0.110, SD = 0.058. 
Finally, across all suggestive (p < .05) cross-lag coefficients, mean absolute differences was 
0.021, SD = 0.015 (range 0.000 to 0.057), with mean absolute coefficient estimate of 0.11, SD = 
0.046. Interpretation proceeds solely with the a priori scales, but direct comparison of all 
significant and suggestive coefficients can be found in the supplemental material. 
Results 
The Reciprocal Influence of Value Priorities and Personality Change  
Coefficients for the cross-lagged effects are described below and are reported in Tables 2 
to 9. Significant cross-lag coefficients indicate associations between values and personality 
scales from earlier to later waves over and above the average linear change across waves for each 
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scale, as well as over and above expectations due to an individual’s previous-wave score. That is, 
a significant cross-lagged regression path of values on personality indicates that a deviation from 
these expectations on a values scale tends to precede an associated deviation in the personality 
scale in later waves. A significant cross-lagged path of a regression of personality on values 
indicates that a deviation from expectations on a values scale precedes a deviation on a 
personality scale. These cross-lagged effects are separate from the between-person intercept-to-
intercept correlations that are also shown in the tables. These indicate between-person 
associations in mean level, separate from the cross-lagged associations due to within-person 
perturbations. Note that it is possible for a values scale to show positive intercept-to-intercept 
correlation with a personality scale while simultaneously showing a negative cross-lagged 
regression effect.  
Results including all parameter estimates, including those for scales modified to achieve 
measurement invariance, are available in supplementary materials. These include within-person 
values-to-values and personality-to-personality auto-regressive associations between structured 
residuals (residuals after accounting for a linear growth curve mean structure), within-person, 
within-wave values to personality correlations between residuals of the structured residuals after 
accounting for the association between the previous wave's personality and values residuals, and 
between-person correlations between individual differences in the growth-curve slopes. 
Unmitigated self-interest. Higher unmitigated self-interest scores preceded lower 
conscientiousness scores, and reciprocally, higher conscientiousness scores preceded lower 
unmitigated self-interest scores. These results were statistically suggestive, at p < .05, rather than 
significant, at p < .005 (see Table 2). Between-person growth-curve intercept correlations were 
significant and negative for honesty/propriety, agreeableness (B6), compassion, politeness, 
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openness, intellect and BFAS openness, while they were suggestive and positive for volatility 
and extraversion.  
Vertical Individualism. Higher vertical individualism significantly preceded lower 
compassion and BFAS intellect and openness scores (see Table 3). At the statistically suggestive 
level, vertical individualism and volatility scores reciprocally preceded each other and higher 
vertical individualism preceded lower BFI openness. Between-person growth-curve intercept 
correlations were significant and negative for honesty/propriety, agreeableness (B6), 
compassion, politeness, neuroticism, and BFAS openness, significant and positive for 
assertiveness, and suggestive and positive for volatility and extraversion.  
Materialism. Between-person growth-curve intercept correlations were significant and 
negative for honesty/propriety, agreeableness (B6), compassion, politeness, openness, intellect 
and BFAS openness, and significant and positive for orderliness, neuroticism, volatility, and 
withdrawal (see Table 4).  
Financial Aspirations.  Between-person growth-curve intercept correlations were 
significant and negative for honesty/propriety, agreeableness (B6), compassion, politeness, 
enthusiasm, openness, intellect and BFAS openness, significant and positive for volatility, and 
assertiveness, and suggestively positive for orderliness (see Table 5).  
Mature Values Index. Higher mature values significantly preceded higher BFAS 
openness scores, and suggestively preceded higher honesty/propriety and politeness (see Table 
6). Between-person growth-curve intercept correlations were significant and positive for 
honesty/propriety, agreeableness (B6), compassion, politeness, openness, intellect, and BFAS 
openness. They were significant and negative for orderliness, and suggestive and negative for 
volatility.  
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Vertical Collectivism. Between-person growth-curve intercept correlations were 
significant and positive with conscientiousness, industriousness, orderliness, honesty/propriety, 
agreeableness (B6), compassion, politeness, and enthusiasm (see Table 7).  
Horizontal Collectivism. Higher horizontal collectivism scores suggestively preceded 
higher orderliness, agreeableness (B6), and assertiveness, and lower intellect (see Table 8). 
Between-person growth-curve intercept correlations were significant and positive for 
conscientiousness, industriousness, honesty/propriety, agreeableness (B6), compassion, 
politeness, extraversion, enthusiasm, and BFAS openness. They were significant and negative 
for neuroticism, volatility, and withdrawal. They were suggestive and positive for orderliness, 
assertiveness, openness, and intellect. 
Horizontal Individualism. Higher horizontal individualism scores suggestively preceded 
lower withdrawal scores (see Table 9). Between-person growth-curve intercept correlations were 
significant and negative for agreeableness (B6) and significant and positive for assertiveness, 
openness, intellect and BFAS openness. They were suggestive and positive for conscientiousness 
and industriousness, and suggestive and negative for compassion, politeness, and enthusiasm.  
In sum, for the combined sample Tables 2 through 9 show no statistically significant but 
three suggestive personality-as-antecedent-to-values change cross-lag coefficients. These tables 
show four statistically significant and ten suggestive values-antecedent-to-personality-change 
coefficients. One coefficient survives FWE-correction (a = .05; vertical individualism 
proceeding compassion), and three coefficients survive FDR-correction (q = .05; vertical 
individualism proceeding compassion, intellect, and the BFAS openness; see supplementary 
materials). It would thus be difficult to conclude that changes in values are systematically 
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downstream of personality attributes (rather than the other way around) as an essentialist trait 
theory would predict. 
Discussion 
The current study explored the reciprocal contributions of Big Five/Six personality traits 
and value-priorities that contrast self-interest with broader concerns in a longitudinal sample 
tested annually on four occasions. These analyses allow us to explore this type of value priorities 
as a source4 of personality change in adulthood. Theories involving essentialist trait concepts 
such as Five Factor Theory would posit that personality will affect values over time, but values 
cannot influence personality. Our results present a different picture, with more significant or 
suggestive effects for values impacting downstream personality scores, as compared to 
personality traits preceding change in values scores. These results match a common-sense view 
of motivation and behavior, in which value-priorities should be upstream, influencing the 
behavioral patterns captured by personality trait measures. They are also consistent with Dweck 
(2017), with value priorities, as a form of motivation, influencing behavior by shaping goals and 
mental representations. However, the results do not provide a strong counter claim to Five Factor 
Theory, as overall the cross-lagged associations were small, and a trait essentialist could argue 
that the influence of traits on values will have already been solidified and thus would not be 
apparent in a relatively short longitudinal design. 
The specific influences of values on personality were consistent with our expectations 
                                                
4  This research was motivated by a causal theory, and we attempt in this discussion to be 
transparent about that. Although the study was not a randomized trial, longitudinal observational 
designs and analyses like that presented here are intended to draw inferences about causality, 
with awareness of assumptions and limitations. As Hernán (2018) argues, avoiding causal 
language entirely forces authors of observational studies to be euphemistic or roundabout about 
their goals, which generates confusion.  
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that higher scores on self-focused (immature, materialistic) values would precede and predict 
unfavorable change in personality traits. Our most robust effects, those that achieved statistical 
significance at the p < .005 level, included vertical individualism preceding lower compassion, 
intellect and BFAS openness, and higher mature values index scores preceding higher BFAS 
openness. At the suggestive (p < .05) level, higher unmitigated self-interest preceded lower 
conscientiousness, higher vertical individualism preceded higher volatility, higher mature values 
preceded higher honesty/propriety and politeness, higher horizontal collectivism preceded higher 
orderliness, agreeableness (B6), and assertiveness and lower intellect, and higher horizontal 
individualism preceded lower withdrawal. In two of three cases, suggestive personality-as-
antecedent-of-values-change effects were reciprocal with the above noted values-effects: higher 
conscientiousness scores reciprocally preceded lower unmitigated self-interest, and higher 
volatility higher vertical individualism. No significant or suggestive “stand-alone”, non-
reciprocal personality on values effects were found.  
The relation between mature values and openness is unsurprising, given May’s emphasis 
on creativity and broad-mindedness. That higher mature values scores preceded higher 
honesty/propriety and politeness is also consistent, given the emphasis on generosity, empathy, 
and unselfishness. However, contrary to May’s theoretical formulation forged from a career as a 
psychotherapist, there were not strong associations with neuroticism and its aspects. This is 
consistent with meta-analytic results indicating a lack of association between neuroticism and the 
Schwartz values (Fischer & Boer, 2015; Parks-Leduc et al., 2015), from which stimuli our 
mature values index was scored. While the cross-lag associations were in the expected 
directions, they were only large enough to reach thresholds for statistical significance in the case 
of vertical individualism with volatility. It is conceivable that early psychologists, like May and 
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others of the existentialist-humanist tradition sometimes valued openness to the extent that they 
took it to indicate psychological health (e.g., Miller, 1991). However, while this trait is related to 
interest in psychotherapy (Miller, Pilkonis, & Mulvey, 2006; Soldz & Vaillant, 1999) and 
personal development and growth generally (DeYoung, Peterson & Higgins, 2005) it does not 
appear to be related to psychological disorders (e.g., Kotov et al., 2010; Malouff, Thorsteinsson, 
& Schutte, 2005). 
An additional expectation was that collectivism would lead to downstream effects on 
traits related to social self-regulation, and individualism with traits related to dynamism. 
Consistent with this, vertical individualism preceded lower compassion and higher volatility, but 
it also predicted lower openness and intellect, suggesting that these aspects of dynamism are not 
increased by a competitive, individualistic point of view. Interest in being an original, curious, 
inventive deep thinker, with aesthetic and artistic aspirations, may be crowded out when one is 
focused on out-competing others. And while horizontal collectivism preceded higher social self-
regulation-related traits like orderliness and agreeableness (B6) and lower dynamism-related 
intellect, it also, more surprisingly preceded the dynamic trait of assertiveness. 
It is of interest that mature values – a composite variable lacking standard psychometric 
strengths – plays a salient role in these results, as a predictor of personality change and one that 
captures some variation in effects across the adult lifespan. This suggests the utility of composite 
measures in prediction. It also underlines the potential of hypotheses drawn from existential 
psychology. 
Note that the strongest relations in Tables 2 to 9 are those between the latent intercepts. 
This implies that the relations between values and personality traits were in many ways pre-
existing, rather than being reciprocally caused by each other’s dynamic perturbations. This is 
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consistent with the idea that though there is some change over the lifespan, personality traits and 
values are characteristics that spring from similar, early developmental sources. The most robust 
of these (significant at the p <.005 level) included positive associations between the 
conscientiousness scales, including industriousness and in one case orderliness, with collectivism 
scales. Orderliness was also positively associated with higher materialism and lower mature 
values. Higher honesty/propriety, agreeableness (B6), compassion, and politeness were all 
associated with lower unmitigated self-interest, vertical individualism, materialism, and financial 
aspirations (plus horizontal individualism in the case of agreeableness) and with higher mature 
values and collectivism. Neuroticism, volatility and/or withdrawal were positively associated 
with financial aspirations and materialism but negatively with vertical individualism and 
horizontal collectivism. Higher openness, intellect and/or BFAS openness were associated with 
lower unmitigated self-interest, vertical individualism, financial aspirations, and materialism, and 
higher mature values, horizontal collectivism and horizontal individualism. Extraversion was 
positively associated with horizontal collectivism and financial aspirations, assertiveness with 
both individualism scales, and enthusiasm with financial aspirations and both collectivism scales. 
It is important to consider how our results, especially our finding that values variables 
had a stronger downstream impact on personality traits than vice versa, have to do with the 
specific type of ethically-relevant values we measured, rather than to values as a general class. 
Fetvadjiev and He (2018) and Vecchione and colleagues (2018) both instead reported greater 
longitudinal impacts of traits on values. However, both these studies used broad measures of 
values, Rokeach’s in the former and the Schwartz scale in the latter. While the mature values 
index is made of items from these scales (though seven of its 17 items are not in the Rokeach 
survey), this index intentionally includes content from the two dimensions these broader scales 
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contrast: both self-determination and self-transcendence. May’s theory suggested the benefits, 
though not the typicality, of embracing elements of both domains. It is even harder to compare 
the broad Rokeach and Schwartz values scales to the other indicators used in the current study. 
Unlike these recent European studies, we did not plan this project as a comprehensive 
assessment of the relation of all values to personality change; we instead sought to test a more 
specific hypothesis about the role of ethics-relevant values, a hypothesis which received some 
support from the findings reported here. Morally relevant values may reflect a channel of cultural 
socialization toward what society considers proper behavior well into adulthood. This may not be 
true for other types of values, some of which simply contrast different interests. 
One interesting point of convergence between our studies involves the personality traits 
that Vecchione and colleagues (2018) observed as being predictors of values change. In their 
results, high agreeableness predicted an increase in benevolence values, and high openness an 
increase in self-direction values. Our findings were that aspects of personality related to 
agreeableness and openness were the ones most affected downstream by the ethically-relevant 
values variables we studied. These two personality dimensions may be more values-related or 
values-responsive than other Big Five dimensions. 
A limitation of the current study true to most observational research, is the possibility that 
both contemporaneous and lagged effects are driven by unobserved variables, for example, 
changes in income. In the case of lagged effects, it is possible that a change in an unobserved 
variable first has consequences for a more malleable variable (e.g., a value) and also, later on, for 
a less malleable variable (e.g., a personality dimension). Another limitation was the short time-
frame. Although the study covered the full range of adulthood, each subject was only followed 
for three years. A longer period would be ideal to capture the small but potentially steady change 
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and development that occurs in both value priorities and personality traits over the life course. A 
longer study period would also better allow for the disentangling of cohort from age effects.  
Conclusion 
This study explored a set of value priorities relevant to ethical behavior as predictors of 
change in Big Five and Big Six personality traits in a national sample of adults. Contrary to an 
essentialist trait perspective, personality attributes did not have more downstream influence on 
values than vice-versa. Instead higher scores on broader-scoped, as opposed to self-focused 
(immature, materialistic), values preceded and predicted favorable change in personality traits in 
terms of increased openness, honesty/propriety, conscientiousness and agreeableness and its 
aspects, and decreased volatility and withdrawal.  
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Table 1  
Values Scales Items, Descriptive Statistics, Retest Correlations, and Correlations with Age and Gender at Time 1  
 Min Max M SD a rretest rt1,t4 rage rfemale 
Unmitigated Self-Interest  
The pleasures of the senses are the highest good 
People ought to be motivated by something beyond their own self-interest 
Nonmaterial attributes are more important than outward beauty 
Worldly possessions are the greatest good and the highest value in life 
There is a higher good than the pleasures of the senses 
The self is the only reality 
0 87.5 28.9 16.2 .67 .78 .73 -.19 -.07 
Materialism 
I would be happier if I could afford to buy more things 
I believe that one of the most important achievements in life involves 
acquiring material possessions 
I believe that the things I own say a lot about how well I’m doing in life 
I don’t pay much attention to the material objects other people own 
I put less emphasis on material objects than most people 
I don’t place much emphasis on the amount of material objects that people 
own as a sign of their success 
0 100 39.8 2.1 .80 .78 .70 -.16 -.03 
Financial Aspirations 
You will buy things just because you want them  
You will be financially successful  
You will be your own boss  
You will have a job with high social status  
You will have a job that pays well  
0 100 48.5 22.2 .80 .79 .73 -.06 -.05 
Mature Values1 
Self- Transcendence 
Mature love (deep emotional and spiritual intimacy) 
A world of beauty (beauty of nature and the arts) 
Wisdom (a mature understanding of life) 
Unity with nature (fitting into nature) 
Being honest (genuine, sincere) 
Being helpful (working for the welfare of others) 
(-) Social power (control over others, dominance) 
(-) Pleasure (gratification of desires) 
3.45 91.9 61.7 8.4 - .81 .75 .10 .17 
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(-) Wealth (material possessions, money) 
(-) A comfortable life (a prosperous life) 
Self-determination 
Creativity (uniqueness, imagination) 
Freedom (freedom of action and thought) 
Meaning in life (a purpose in life) 
Choosing own goals (selecting own purposes) 
(-) Preserving my public image (protecting my face) 
(-) Social recognition (respect, approval by others) 
(-) Being obedient (dutiful, meeting obligations) 
Vertical Individualism 
It is important that I do my job better than others 
Winning is everything 
Competition is the law of nature 
When another person does better than I do, I get tense and aroused 
0 100 47.2 19.3 .65 .71 .64 -.15 -.16 
Vertical Collectivism 
Parents and children must stay together as much as possible 
It is my duty to take care of my family, even when I have to sacrifice what 
I want 
Family members should stick together, no matter what sacrifices are 
required 
It is important to me that I respect the decisions made by my groups 
6.25 100 71.5 18.1 .67 .72 .70 .12 .03 
Horizontal Collectivism 
If a coworker got a prize, I would feel proud 
The well-being of my coworkers is important to me 
To me, pleasure is spending time with others 
I feel good when I cooperate with others 
6.25 100 72.2 17.1 .71 .73 .68 .20 .09 
Horizontal Individualism 
I’d rather depend on myself than others 
I rely on myself most of the time; I rarely rely on others 
I often do my own thing 
My personal identity, independent of others, is important to me 
18.75 100 74.5 15.8 .56 .59 .54 -.06 .01 
Note. N=862-864. All scales were rescaled to percent of maximum possible (POMP), giving scores a possible range of 0 to 100 
(Cohen, Cohen, Aiken, & West, 1999). Minimum, maximum, mean, standard deviation, and age and gender correlations are at Time 
1. mir = mean inter-item correlation, vir = variance of inter-item correlations, both are measures of unidimensionality (Clark & 
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Watson, 1995). rretest is an average of retest correlations between years 1 and 2, 2 and 3, and 3 and 4. rt1,t4  is the Time 1 to Time 4 
retest correlation. For correlations with age and gender, bolding indicates p < .01.  
1 This scale was scored by averaging the 10 forward-keyed and the 7 reverse-keyed items separately, then transforming each 
into percent of maximum possible (POMP) scores. These two subscales were then averaged for the final scale. The alpha and mean 
and variance of inter item correlation values, however, were calculated on the full set of items entered as a single group. Note also that 
alpha is not a valid measure of reliability if the scale is not unidimensional.  
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Table 2 
Cross-Lagged Associations and Growth-Curve Intercept Correlations Between Unmitigated 
Self-Interest and Personality scales 
Scale P® V SE V ® P SE rIv,Ip 
 Conscientiousness BFI -.10 .04 -.09 .04 .06 
      
   Industriousness BFAS -.03 .04 .01 .04 .10 
      
   Orderliness BFAS -.04 .04 -.07 .04 .11 
      
 Honesty/Propriety BFI -.03 .04 -.07 .04 -.34* 
      
 Agreeableness(B6) BFI .06 .03 -.05 .04 -.26* 
      
   Compassion BFAS .00 .04 -.02 .04 -.47* 
      
   Politeness BFAS .04 .04 -.03 .03 -.33* 
      
 Neuroticism BFI -.05 .03 .05 .04 .03 
      
   Volatility BFAS -.03 .05 .08 .05 .12 
      
   Withdrawal BFAS -.03 .03 -.01 .04 .04 
      
 Extraversion BFI .01 .04 .01 .04 .14 
      
   Assertiveness BFAS -.03 .04 -.03 .04 .11 
      
   Enthusiasm BFAS .03 .04 .01 .03 -.01 
      
 Openness BFI -.04 .06 -.04 .03 -.25* 
      
   Intellect BFAS -.01 .04 -.05 .03 -.25* 
      
   Openness BFAS -.02 .05 -.06 .04 -.27* 
      
Note. Time 1 N =853-856. Subsequent waves include fewer observations; exact Ns detailed in 
supplement. P®V = coefficient for regression of values score on previous wave personality 
score; V®P = coefficient for regression of personality score on previous wave values score. rIv,Ip 
= between person intercept correlation. Bolding indicates p < .05. *p < .005. 
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Table 3  
Cross-Lagged Associations and Growth-Curve Intercept Correlations Between Vertical 
Individualism and Personality scales 
Scale P® V SE V ® P SE rIv,Ip 
 Conscientiousness BFI .04 .06 .02 .03 .00 
      
   Industriousness BFAS .01 .05 .03 .03 .02 
      
   Orderliness BFAS .04 .06 -.01 .03 .06 
      
 Honesty/Propriety BFI .02 .06 -.02 .03 -.39* 
      
 Agreeableness(B6) BFI -.01 .05 .00 .03 -.35* 
      
   Compassion BFAS .00 .06 -.08* .02 -.38* 
      
   Politeness BFAS -.01 .06 -.09* .03 -.50* 
      
 Neuroticism BFI .03 .05 .05 .03   .05* 
      
   Volatility BFAS .11 .05 .10 .04 .17 
      
   Withdrawal BFAS .00 .04 -.02 .03 .09 
      
 Extraversion BFI .03 .06 .01 .03 .11 
      
   Assertiveness BFAS .02 .05 .00 .03   .18* 
      
   Enthusiasm BFAS .05 .06 .01 .03 -.10 
      
 Openness BFI -.03 .07 -.06 .03 -.10 
      
   Intellect BFAS -.10 .06 -.08* .02 -.06 
      
   Openness BFAS -.17 .06 -.09* .03 -.21* 
      
Note. Time 1 N =853-856. Subsequent waves include fewer observations; exact Ns detailed in 
supplement. P®V = coefficient for regression of values score on previous wave personality 
score; V®P = coefficient for regression of personality score on previous wave values score. rIv,Ip 
= between person intercept correlation. Bolding indicates p < .05. *p < .005. 
  
PERSONALITY AND VALUES 43 
Table 4 
Cross-Lagged Associations and Growth-Curve Intercept Correlations Between Materialism and 
Personality scales 
Scale P® V SE V ® P SE rIv,Ip 
 Conscientiousness BFI -.01 .05 -.01 .03 -.08 
      
   Industriousness BFAS .07 .05 .03 .03 -.07 
      
   Orderliness BFAS -.06 .06 -.04 .03 .17* 
      
 Honesty/Propriety BFI -.05 .05 -.06 .03 -.35* 
      
 Agreeableness(B6) BFI -.04 .05 -.05 .04 -.36* 
      
   Compassion BFAS -.02 .06 -.03 .03 -.35* 
      
   Politeness BFAS -.01 .05 -.02 .03 -.34* 
      
 Neuroticism BFI -.02 .04 .03 .03 .18* 
      
   Volatility BFAS -.03 .04 .06 .03 .27* 
      
   Withdrawal BFAS -.01 .05 .00 .03 .23* 
      
 Extraversion BFI -.06 .07 -.02 .03 .06 
      
   Assertiveness BFAS -.01 .06 -.02 .03 -.01 
      
   Enthusiasm BFAS -.01 .06 -.01 .03 -.04 
      
 Openness BFI .10 .07 -.03 .03 -.23* 
      
   Intellect BFAS -.03 .06 -.01 .03 -.26* 
      
   Openness BFAS -.10 .06 -.01 .03 -.25* 
      
Note. Time 1 N =853-856. Subsequent waves include fewer observations; exact Ns detailed in 
supplement. P®V = coefficient for regression of values score on previous wave personality 
score; V®P = coefficient for regression of personality score on previous wave values score. rIv,Ip 
= between person intercept correlation. Bolding indicates p < .05. *p < .005. 
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Table 5 
Cross-Lagged Associations and Growth-Curve Intercept Correlations Between Financial 
Aspirations and Personality scales 
Scale P® V SE V ® P SE rIv,Ip 
 Conscientiousness BFI .02 .04 -.05 .04 -.05 
      
   Industriousness BFAS .05 .04 -.06 .05 -.02 
      
   Orderliness BFAS .01 .04 -.04 .04 .11 
      
 Honesty/Propriety BFI -.05 .03 -.05 .05 -.40ª 
      
 Agreeableness(B6) BFI -.02 .03 -.04 .06 -.39ª 
      
   Compassion BFAS .02 .03 -.07 .04 -.58ª 
      
   Politeness BFAS 0 .04 -.06 .04 -.43ª 
      
 Neuroticism BFI 0 .03 .09 .05 .01 
      
   Volatility BFAS -.01 .03 .08 .06 .17ª 
      
   Withdrawal BFAS 0 .03 .01 .05 .09 
      
 Extraversion BFI .01 .04 -.03 .05 .05 
      
   Assertiveness BFAS .04 .04 -.09 .05 .08 
      
   Enthusiasm BFAS .01 .04 -.03 .05 -.18ª 
      
 Openness BFI .04 .05 -.04 .04 -.17ª 
      
   Intellect BFAS .01 .04 -.02 .04 -.18ª 
      
   Openness BFAS .01 .04 -.06 .04 -.27ª 
      
Note. Time 1 N =853-856. Subsequent waves include fewer observations; exact Ns detailed in 
supplement. P®V = coefficient for regression of values score on previous wave personality 
score; V®P = coefficient for regression of personality score on previous wave values score. rIv,Ip 
= between person intercept correlation. Bolding indicates p < .05. *p < .005. 
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Table 6 
Cross-Lagged Associations and Growth-Curve Intercept Correlations Between Mature Values 
Index and Personality scales 
Scale P® V SE V ® P SE rIv,Ip 
 Conscientiousness BFI .03 .02 .13 .08 -.05 
      
   Industriousness BFAS .00 .02 .10 .08 -.02 
      
   Orderliness BFAS .01 .02 .01 .08 -.19* 
      
 Honesty/Propriety BFI .01 .02 .21 .09 .34* 
      
 Agreeableness(B6) BFI .01 .02 .17 .09 .30* 
      
   Compassion BFAS -.01 .02 .16 .08 .54* 
      
   Politeness BFAS -.01 .02 .16 .08 .38* 
      
 Neuroticism BFI .02 .01 -.14 .09 -.02 
      
   Volatility BFAS -.01 .02 -.11 .10 -.12 
      
   Withdrawal BFAS -.01 .02 .04 .08 -.06 
      
 Extraversion BFI -.02 .02 .03 .08 -.08 
      
   Assertiveness BFAS .01 .02 .09 .08 -.00 
      
   Enthusiasm BFAS .02 .02 .12 .08 -.06 
      
 Openness BFI .00 .03 .09 .07 .48* 
      
   Intellect BFAS .04 .02 .09 .07 .30* 
      
   Openness BFAS .02 .02 .21* .07 .61* 
      
Note. Time 1 N =853-856. Subsequent waves include fewer observations; exact Ns detailed in 
supplement. P®V = coefficient for regression of values score on previous wave personality 
score; V®P = coefficient for regression of personality score on previous wave values score. rIv,Ip 
= between person intercept correlation. Bolding indicates p < .05. *p < .005. 
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Table 7 
Cross-Lagged Associations and Growth-Curve Intercept Correlations Between Vertical 
Collectivism and Personality scales 
Scale P® V SE V ® P SE rIv,Ip 
 Conscientiousness BFI .00 .06 .05 .03 .21* 
      
   Industriousness BFAS .05 .06 .03 .03 .24* 
      
   Orderliness BFAS .07 .07 .01 .03 .20* 
      
 Honesty/Propriety BFI .01 .06 .02 .03 .26* 
      
 Agreeableness(B6) BFI .07 .05 .03 .03 .25* 
      
   Compassion BFAS .03 .06 .00 .03 .30* 
      
   Politeness BFAS -.02 .06 .02 .03 .38* 
      
 Neuroticism BFI -.01 .05 .00 .04 -.08 
      
   Volatility BFAS .03 .05 .04 .04 -.11 
      
   Withdrawal BFAS -.03 .05 -.03 .03 -.05 
      
 Extraversion BFI -.06 .06 .00 .04 .12 
      
   Assertiveness BFAS -.03 .06 .02 .03 .06 
      
   Enthusiasm BFAS .06 .06 .05 .03  .25* 
      
 Openness BFI -.02 .06 .02 .03 -.04 
      
   Intellect BFAS .00 .06 -.01 .03 -.01 
      
   Openness BFAS .00 .07 .00 .03 .05 
      
Note. Time 1 N =853-856. Subsequent waves include fewer observations; exact Ns detailed in 
supplement. P®V = coefficient for regression of values score on previous wave personality 
score; V®P = coefficient for regression of personality score on previous wave values score. rIv,Ip 
= between person intercept correlation. Bolding indicates p < .05. *p < .005. 
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Table 8 
Cross-Lagged Associations and Growth-Curve Intercept Correlations Between Horizontal 
Collectivism and Personality scales 
Scale P® V SE V ® P SE rIv,Ip 
 Conscientiousness BFI .04 .05 .07 .04 .30* 
      
   Industriousness BFAS .02 .04 .04 .04 .32* 
      
   Orderliness BFAS .08 .05 .08 .03 .14 
      
 Honesty/Propriety BFI .02 .05 .06 .04 .40* 
      
 Agreeableness(B6) BFI .06 .04 .08 .04 .58* 
      
   Compassion BFAS .08 .05 .03 .04 .61* 
      
   Politeness BFAS .05 .05 -.01 .04 .51* 
      
 Neuroticism BFI -.04 .04 -.06 .04 -.26* 
      
   Volatility BFAS .03 .04 .00 .04 -.36* 
      
   Withdrawal BFAS -.03 .04 -.04 .04 -.30* 
      
 Extraversion BFI .03 .05 .05 .04 .31* 
      
   Assertiveness BFAS .06 .05 .08 .04 .13 
      
   Enthusiasm BFAS .05 .05 .05 .04 .53* 
      
 Openness BFI .02 .06 .07 .04 .15 
      
   Intellect BFAS -.09 .05 -.06 .03 .13 
      
   Openness BFAS -.01 .05 .04 .03 .24* 
      
Note. Time 1 N =853-856. Subsequent waves include fewer observations; exact Ns detailed in 
supplement. P®V = coefficient for regression of values score on previous wave personality 
score; V®P = coefficient for regression of personality score on previous wave values score. rIv,Ip 
= between person intercept correlation. DAIC = difference in AIC between constrained (across 
age) and unconstrained (for two age groups) models. Bolding indicates p < .05. *p < .005. 
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Table 9 
Cross-Lagged Associations and Growth-Curve Intercept Correlations Between Horizontal 
Individualism and Personality scales 
Scale P® V SE V ® P SE rIv,Ip 
 Conscientiousness BFI .02 .05 .06 .03 .16 
      
   Industriousness BFAS .03 .05 .04 .03 .16 
      
   Orderliness BFAS .06 .05 -.01 .03 .12 
      
 Honesty/Propriety BFI -.04 .05 -.01 .03 -.06 
      
 Agreeableness(B6) BFI -.01 .04 -.00 .03   -.21* 
      
   Compassion BFAS -.04 .05 .03 .03 -.12 
      
   Politeness BFAS .03 .05 -.03 .03 -.14 
      
 Neuroticism BFI -.05 .04 -.05 .03 -.01 
      
   Volatility BFAS -.00 .04 .01 .04 .03 
      
   Withdrawal BFAS -.05 .04 -.06 .03 -.04 
      
 Extraversion BFI .03 .05 -.01 .03 .07 
      
   Assertiveness BFAS .06 .05 .02 .03  .20* 
      
   Enthusiasm BFAS .06 .05 .01 .03 -.15 
      
 Openness BFI -.02 .06 -.00 .03  .22* 
      
   Intellect BFAS .00 .06 .02 .03  .24* 
      
   Openness BFAS -.05 .06 -.02 .02  .17* 
      
Note. Time 1 N =853-856. Subsequent waves include fewer observations; exact Ns detailed in 
supplement. P®V = coefficient for regression of values score on previous wave personality 
score; V®P = coefficient for regression of personality score on previous wave values score. rIv,Ip 
= between person intercept correlation. Bolding indicates p < .05. *p < .005. 
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Figure 1. Diagram representing the Latent Curve Model with Structured Residuals. Manifest 
variables are computed scale scores for each value and personality variable. Latent structured 
residual factors (SR) have loadings fixed to 1. Autoregressive paths are fixed to be equal 
between waves for the value (a) and personality (b) variables. Cross lagged paths are also fixed 
to equality both for personality SRs regressed on value SRs (c) and value SRs regressed on 
personality SRs (d). The within-wave correlations of SR residuals are fixed to equality for the 
last three waves (e). 
 
 
 
